Feb 06

Update February 6, 2012

Hello, Friends,
This pertains to my federal court challenge of portions of the recent statewide election process.  Initially filed in August of 2010, the action seeks a court mandaus regarding the Republican primary election (that initially for legal issues regarding actions of then Secretary of State Susan Bysiewicz) plus financial compensation.  Named Defendants include former Secretary of State Bysiewicz, former Attorney General Richard Blumenthal and the Co-Chairmen of the Government Administration & Elections Committee. The lawsuit was amended in November 2010 to challenge also the election results for the position of U.S. Senator (with subsequent issues raised also regarding the results of the election for Governor).
After the lawsuit was dismissed in Federal District Court in February 2011 (by Judge Peter C. Dorsey, formally a U.S. Attorney as was Richard Blumenthal), I appealed his decision to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.  There, the court curiously put the matter through some procedural hoops until November 17, 2011 when it issued a ruling to dismiss the Appeal for the stated reason that it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.  I promptly presented a Motion for Reargument which was denied.  On January 27, 2012, the court issued a Mandate.  The issuance of a mandate is the procedural device whereby the Court of Appeals gives notice of having completed its review for which its jurisdiction of an appeal ends and jurisdiction of the case can return for certain purposes to the District Court.  None of these procedural steps prevents one from taking the matter to the U.S. Supreme Court.  However, there is a procedure for recalling a mandate, that to be used where a litigant believes that the Court of Appeals committed error and he may seek further review from the Court of Appeals.
Upon receiving notice of the issuance of the Mandate, for my understanding of the reasons given that the court dismissed the Appeal, I promptly prepared the attached Motion and sent it to the Court of Appeals on Saturday (38 pages of text plus 41 pages of 8 Exhibits attached separately).
I briefly describe here key portions of the Motion.
Pages 1 through 8 give Background Information.  With other background information which is available at my campaign website, there is a long-term saga (one involving a high level of political intrigue stemming from my actions in 1985 as a specialized bank officer of observing some politically-sensitive problems of state public works), a review of which allows one to understand some contextual matters which interrelate and bolster particular legal issues observed of the election process.
Page 9 discusses legal references about the procedure of the mandate, the authority of the court to recall a mandate, and some of the factors which are established for justifying such a recall.
At page 10, there is discussion of the decision of Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), the case reference cited by the Court of Appeals for its decision to dismiss the Appeal.  Based on my review of the case, the guidelines for such a dismissal clearly do not fit this legitimate election challenge.
At page 11, I describe several bases for which I believe that the court erred in its decision.  One is of predilection.  Another is conflict of interest.  And the third is substantive due process.  Substantive due process involves governmental actions which are arbitrary, conscience-shocking and constitutionally oppressive.
I also assert that I believe that the same issue of substantive due process is the explanation of why various appeals which I have presented to the Second Circuit since 1995 have been dismissed.  One of those is the 1995 filing of Ethan Book Jr. v. Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority (CRRA) et al., an action in which I made proper, well-supported claims of mail fraud, bond fraud, bidrigging, conspiracy and related matters. Fundamentally, the case deals with matters of governmental accountability and government corruption.  Other named Defendants include the Office of the Attorney General, the Office of the Chief State's Attorney, the investment bank First Boston Corporation and several others.  The Office of the Attorney General was a named Defendant for actions committed under the administration of Joseph Lieberman (Attorney General until 1989).  However, the case ended up being assigned to District Judge Dominic Squatrito, who less than six months prior to being assigned the case, was Senator Lieberman's campaign treasurer (Lieberman, Squatrito, Blumenthal and Bill Clinton were classmates at Yale Law School).  Despite me having timely brought the issue of the apparent conflict of interest to the attention of Judge Squatrito and seeking that he recuse himself from the case, he declined to recuse himself and he proceeded to dismiss the lawsuit for reasons which don't reasonably fit (i.e., of my standing, of statutes of limitations and of stating a claim).  An early appeal of that was dismissed by the Court of Appeals for procedural reasons (then under Chief Judge Jon Newman, a colleague of Joseph Lieberman and for whom Mr. Blumenthal worked as law clerk in the District Court before Judge Newman was appointed to the Second Circuit).  During the active portion of my campaign for the U.S. Senate in 2010, I obtained access to additonal information which bolstered my claim of a conflict of interest for Judge Squatrito for which I sought to reopen that case at the District Court.  Again, Judge Squatrito arbitrarily denied my pleadings for which I appealed those actions to the Second Circuit. The CRRA case and others related to that are useful for understanding why I began my political campaign for the U.S. Senate, that in February 2010 just after Mr. Blumenthal announced that he would seek the Democrat Party nomination for the U.S. Senate (that concurrent with the curiously-timed announcement of Senator Christopher Dodd that he would not seek re-election) and of issues which interplay with the various glaring legal defects of the recent statewide election process.
In my Motion to Recall Mandate, I then discuss various observed court biases (pgs. 12 - 14).  These include political bias, reverse-gender bias and bias against self-represented litigants.  At page 13, I make a very important statement:
"Reverse-gender bias is a critical political cancer to current American society!  It has become a de-facto novo-slavery!  Also, reverse-gender bias is a vehicle by which other sensitive political biases and preferences are administered!"
I then make some pungent quotes from a World Affairs brief by Joel M. Skousen entitled "Corruption of the Judicial System". Those are notable for review. I also refer to a letter which I sent on January 29th to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (at p. 14 referring to Exhibit 4).
At pages 15 through 20, I give discussion of a crucially important concept that I call the secularization of government (which others have called the emergence of relativism or pragmatism and the Progressive rejection of the Constitution).  In that, I discuss various factors of the original intent of our Founding Fathers for the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut, the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, and of steps of the evolution of leaders of our nation including of Supreme Court justices to deviate from the original letter and intent of our great nation's foundation.  Among the more dominent stages of that evolving process are a set of glaring federal actions of 1913, and the Court of Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren (1953 - 1969).
At pages 21 and 22, I give docket reference for court pleadings which are primary reference to the Motion to Recall Mandate (many of such documents which are posted at my campaign website and with others which can be posted or otherwise made available).  I categorize the issues which are part of the Appeal as being legal issues, mainly referring to the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court, and claims issues which involve the question of whether sufficient information has been presented to support the claims raised.  With reference to Neitzke v. Williams, the only kinds of issues which could be a normal basis for a preliminary dismissal of an appeal as the court has attempted for this are those which deal with legal issues such as of subject-matter jurisdiction.  Issues of stating a claim are rarely a proper basis for such a dismissal.  Also, the most important issues regarding the election challenge are the legal issues of subject matter jurisdiction which are those which pertain to the requested mandamus. The other issues, while they pertain to the legal issues inherent to the demand for mandamus and bolster those, are of stating a claim  and they pertain to the demand for financial compensation.  Those are important and they interplay with the demand for mandamus but for the present review, they can be considered separately.
The legal issues which pertain to subject matter jurisdiction are discussed at pages 23 through 29.  Considering what is discussed here and essentially unchallenged by the Defendants' Attorney Robert Snook (who uses the title Assistant Attorney General but whom was never hired by the Office of the Attorney General in accord with the mandatory requirements of the State Personnel Act), I don't conceive of a reasonable lawful basis for dismissal.  On the matters discussed, at this stage of the appeal process, I don't have to be correct on my legal positions, rather I merely need to present an arguable basis for appeal.  That is done and them some!
With regard to federal court jurisdiction to review a state election process, one may obtain such jurisdiction where an election process "'reaches the point of patent and fundamental unfairness . . . " and where "'willful conduct . . . undermines the organic processes by which candidates are elected'" (at p. 24).  With other information such as is contained in the Amended Complaint of November 4, 2010 (available at my campaign website), I then reassert that "In fact, this must be one of the most egregious cases of judicial record where the election process has reached the point of 'patent and fundamental infairness'" (at p. 25).
I then refer to a statement which I early reasserted in a letter that I sent to Mr. Blumenthal on January 9, 2010 (that sent two days after his announcement to campaign for the position of U.S. Senator; full text of letter available at my website):
". . .  it is apparent that you and officials under your authority abuse your positions to influence officials of state agencies and state courts as collateral attack against citizens who might have legitimate federal claims agains state officials or against the state" (at p. 25).
I then elaborate on that:
"The significance of this publicly declared and undisputed statement is great!  When one fully considers it, it becomes apparent that what was alleged against former President Richard Nixon, what was alleged against former New York Governor Elliot Spitzer and even what was recently alleged against New York Congressman Anthony Weiner is pale in comparison"  (at p.25).
Then when one considers how substantive, legitimate related claims were not simply not addressed by the federal courts in other prior matters, but were actually evaded by those courts, I then state, "In essence, these federal courts and the Connecticut state courts were a major factor in spiking the recent statewide election process" (at p. 26).
With proper context, at page 27, quoting from my recent letter to Senator Reid, I state,
"When a high-level public figure knowingly abuses his position either directly or through his associates to put a man in jail and/or to keep him in jail for no other reason than that the man is a political threat, it is in the broad public interest that such conducts be fully exposed, also that such action should preclude that figure from being promoted to higher officer and further that the figure be subject to prosecution!"
At pages 29 through 31, I discuss issues of stating claims for the matters raised of financial compensation against the various named Defendants.  I begin by explaining that the legal standard for stating a claim is low, that is that a litigant need not prove his claims or even be required to give information that would make the claims probable.  Rather, a litigant must merely give a showing such that the claims be "plausible".  Simply from the brief discussion that I give of the various claims for damages, there is more than sufficient for stating a claim, let alone an arguable factual basis which is discussed in Neitzke v. Williams.
I then discuss some other related matters including of the issue of what I call "weed-gate" a reported and to-date unchallenged report that Christopher Dodd, during his earlier years of serving as Congressman, just before he was elected to the U.S. Senate, was a partner in an illegal scheme to import a large planeload of marijuana from Latin America to the U.S., that the scheme was busted by federal authorities and that Mr. Dodd allowed his partner to take the rap, that involving a five-year sentence in federal prison, all while Mr. Dodd evaded responsibility.  For me, that issue began with a letter which I sent to Senator Dodd on November 20, 2009 (post at website).  Other follow-up has been made as is evidenced by a letter sent to Mr. Dodd on November 27, 2011 (provided as Exhibit 7 to the attached Motion).  As one reviews that set of correspondences, the interrelationship of that yet unaddressed issue with other issues of state and national interest including of the starting point and progression for Mr. Blumenthal's campaign for the U.S. Senate becomes more apparent.
I then give several additional references of original intent and of current national purpose (at pgs. 35 through 37).
There are many important public issues involved in this material for which I take this means to share this with you!
May God bless America!
Regards,
Ethan Book

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